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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
VIVIAN ALLGOOD, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
DELMAR LARSON, Sheriff of Salt 
Lake County and THE CITY OF 
SALT LAKE, 
Defendants-Appellants. 
Case No. 14094 
PETITION FOR REHEARING 
TO THE HONORABLE CHIEF JUSTICE AND JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH: 
Appellant, Salt Lake City Corporation, respectfully petitions the Court for a rehearing on 
its opinion filed in the above-entitled cause on the 12th day of January, 1976. The grounds 
for this Petition and the points wherein the appellants allege this Court has erred are as 
follows: 
1. The controlling opinion ignores the Legislature's specific grant of authority to 
municipalities to punish the offense of trespass as set out in section 10-8-50, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, and cites as supporting authority for its holding a general statement of law 
based on statutory enactments entirely contrary to the statutory provisions of the State of 
Utah. 
2. The controlling opinion is inconsistent with the legislative intent of the State Penal 
Code and the municipal powers specified in Title 10 of the Utah Code Annotated 1953, and 
previous case holdings of this Court. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE CONTROLLING OPINION IGNORES THE LEGISLATURE'S SPECIFIC GRANT 
OF AUTHORITY TO MUNICIPALITIES TO PUNISH THE OFFENSE OF TRESPASS 
AS SET OUT IN SECTION 10-8-50, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED AND CITES AS 
SUPPORTING AUTHORITY FOR ITS HOLDING A GENERAL STATEMENT OF 
LAW BASED ON STATUTORY ENACTMENTS ENTIRELY CONTRARY TO THE 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS OF THE STATE OF UTAH. 
The controlling opinion of the Court is based upon the premise that Salt Lake City has 
based its trespass ordinance solely upon the implied powers granted to cities and towns by 
the Legislature in Section 10-8-84, Utah Code Ann. 1953. The opinion cites authority and 
case law in support of its holding that those implied powers of cities and towns, which are 
not reasonably necessary in carrying out their express duties, are denied them. 
The controlling opinion cites Lark v. Whitehead, 28 Utah 2d 343, 502 P.2d 577 (1972) 
and Nasfell v. Ogden, 122 Utah 344, 249 P.2d 507 (1952) for the proposition that: 
"Cities have none of the elements of sovereignty and that any fair, reasonable, 
substantial doubt concerning the existence of the power is resolved by the courts 
against the corporation (city) and the power denied; grants of power to cities are 
strictly construed to the exclusion of implied powers which are not reasonably 
necessary in carrying out the purposes of the express powers granted." 
With this reasoning the city finds no fault in applicable and relevant areas. However, in 
the instant case the controlling opinion ignores the legislative grant of authority of Section 
10-8-50, Utah Code Annotated that specifically enables the city to do the very thing that the 
controlling opinion states the city does not have the implied power to do. In this section the 
Legislature of the State of Utah specifically granted municipalities the power to: 
"Provide for the punishment of trespass . . . as the Board of Commissioners 
. . . may deem proper." 
This Court has, on numerous occasions,held that the general powers spoken of in Section 
10-8-84 Utah Code Ann. 1953 are limited to those powers specifically granted to cities and 
towns within the chapter. As has been shown, the power to punish the offense of trespass is 
a specific grant of power "within the chapter" to be punished as deemed proper by the 
Board of Commissioners within the limitations set by Section 10-8-84 Utah Code Ann. 
1953. 
The controlling opinion also cites in addition to the case law cited above, a brief portion 
from McQuillin that is based on this same premise of "insufficiency of implied powers." 
The inapplicability of this particular citation is made clear in light of the specific provisions 
of Section 10-8-50, and by looking at McQuillin in full context as pointed out by Justice 
Crockett in his dissenting opinion. McQuillin states: 
"In some instances an ordinance that covers an offense denounced by statute 
must, in the absence of authorization to impose a different penalty, prescribe the 
same penalty as the statute. In other words, if the ordinance penalty conflicts 
with that of the general law of the state covering the same subject, the ordinance 
is void. The charter or ordinance penalty cannot exceed that of the state law." 
(Emphasis added.) 5 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, §17.15 p. 326 (3rd 
Ed.) 
Section 10-8-50 Utah Code Ann. 1953 does contain the express authorization to enact the 
same or different penalty as prescribed by state law, and therefore the ordinance does not 
conflict with state law, but is based wholly upon it and is consistent therewith. McQuillin 
goes on to clarify this point by stating the position of the law in states such as Utah where 
there is a specific enabling grant from the legislature: 
"Where the unlawful act may be an offense against both the state and the 
municipal corporation decisions exist to the effect that the penalty of the 
ordinance, where it is not otherwise limited to such extent, may be greater than 
that provided in the state statute . . . Clearly, of course, a statutory penalty may 
be exceeded or increased by the penalty of an ordinance where power to impose 
such penalty by ordinance has been expressly given." (Emphasis added.) 5 
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, §17.15 p. 328, 239, (3rd Ed.) 
Such is the case in the present instance. 
POINT II 
THE CONTROLLING OPINION OF THE COURT IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE 
LEGISLATIVE INTENT OF THE STATE PENAL CODE AND THE MUNICIPAL 
POWERS SPECIFIED IN TITLE 10 OF THE UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, AND 
PREVIOUS CASE HOLDINGS OF THIS COURT. 
The controlling opinion of the Court implies that the new Penal Code expressly pre-empts 
the enforcement of all other criminal offenses which are provided for outside of the new 
Penal Code. However, Section 76-1-103(1) Utah Code Ann. 1953, which deals with the 
scope and applicability of the Penal Code provides: 
'The provisions of this code shall govern the construction of, the punishment 
for and defenses against any offense defined in this code or, except where 
otherwise specifically provided or the context otherwise requires, any offense 
defined outside this code;" (Emphasis added.) 
The city maintains that Section 10-8-50 Utah Code Ann. constitutes a legislative 
enactment which is ''otherwise specifically provided" for outside of the Penal Code as are 
the rest of the specific powers granted by the Legislature to municipalities to deal with 
misdemeanors. By inserting the language "except where otherwise specifically provided or 
the context otherwise requires" in the section of the code dealing with the Penal Code's 
application, the Legislature manifested its intent not to emasculate the enabling powers 
granted to cities and towns to provide for misdemeanor offenses. Further, it was not the 
intent of the Legislature to make all of the ordinances of cities and towns subject to the 
State Penal Code. To hold otherwise would be to render meaningless the powers of Title 10 
dealing with the powers and duties of cities and towns, a situation that was never intended 
or contemplated by the Legislature of the State. 
The controlling opinion of the Court holds that Salt Lake City's trespass ordinance is in 
conflict with State law. In making such a determination the opinion fails to apply the test 
that has been adopted by this Court for determining whether or not an ordinance is in 
conflict with State law. This test is cited in Salt Lake City v. Allred, 20 U.2d 298, 437 P. 2d 
434 (1968) and Salt Lake City v. Kusse, 97 U. 113 93 P.2d 671 (1939) and restated in the 
dissenting opinion of Justice Crockett: 
"The test whether an ordinance is repugnant to or in conflict with state law is 
not whether it deals with the same subject matter in a different manner by 
providing a different penalty, but it is whether the ordinance permits or licenses 
something which the state statute forbids or prohibits, or vice versa. (Cases cited 
therein.) 
"The ordinance here in question does not authorize what the state law has 
forbidden, nor does it forbid what the state law has authorized. It is therefore 
my opinion: that the ordinance is within the authority granted to the city and 
the responsibilities it is enjoined to carry out; that it is neither repugnant to nor 
inconsistent with other existing law, but is supplementary thereto; and that 
therefore it should not be declared void. 
Salt Lake City's trespass ordinance is consistent with and conforms to this long-adopted 
and approved test. The court should, therefore, apply this test and the above-cited decisions 
in the instant case. 
The controlling opinion cites Smith v. Hyde, 97 Utah 280, 92 P.2d 1098 (1939) in support 
of its decision that the City's trespass ordinance conflicts with state law. In Smith a 
Tremonton city ordinance was held to be in conflict with State law. That case was correctly 
decided and is easily distinguished from the instant case. In Smith the State Legislature, 
through specific enabling power, had granted cities and towns the power to impose jail 
sentences for unpaid fines at the rate of one day for each $2.00 of an outstanding fine. The 
city of Tremonton's ordinance conflicted with this specific grant of enabling power in that it 
provided that only $1.00 of an unpaid fine was to be satisfied for each day of incarceration. 
To find Smith applicable to the instant case, Salt Lake City would have had to have 
violated or exceeded the limitations set by the Legislature of a specific enabling power such 
as imposing a fine greater than $300.00 or imposing a jail sentence of longer than six 
months. This the city clearly has not done, but it has acted within the specific legislative 
grant of authority under the enabling powers of cities and towns. 
CONCLUSION 
The petitioner has shown that the Legislature has given a definite and specific grant of 
authority enabling the city to provide for the punishment of trespass by imprisonment. This 
specific enabling power, found in Section 10-8-50, Utah Code Ann. 1953, was expressly 
exempted by the Legislature from falling under the purview and application of the State 
Penal Code by Section 76-1-103(1). If the existing case law of this State, determining 
whether a city ordinance is in conflict with a State statute, were properly applied in the 
instant case, Salt Lake City's trespass ordinance would be shown not to be in conflict with 
State law. This is especially so in light of the specific enabling power of Section 10-8-50. 
Petitioner has further shown that some of the authorities cited in the controlling opinion do 
not accurately reflect the true intent of the Legislature nor the true state of the law in Utah. 
A decision should therefore be rendered in the instant matter consistent with the specific 
statutory enactments of the Legislature of this State and previous holdings of this Court, 
and the recognized authorities of municipal law upholding the petitioner's right to punish 
the offense of trespass by imprisonment. 
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ROGER F. CUTLER 
City Attorney 
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